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SYNOPSIS
FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND COSMOPOLITANISM
1. Faith and knowledge as mutually dependent.
2. Generalisation and its limitations.
3. The inadequacy of radical reductionism.
4. Basic scientific presuppositions are analogous to the 
religious presumption that there is an underlying cor­
respondence between man and reality.
5. The famous conflicts between science and religion 
(notably, re the sun’s centrality and re evolutionism) 
were really clashes between old and new doctrines of 
nature.
6. Important is the distinction between questions of the 
why type (resulting in purposive explanations) and 
questions of the how type (resulting in mechanistic 
explanations).
7. The subjective sense of certainty in personal convic­
tions needs objective (rational) corroboration.
8. Generation (creativity) is logically prior to decay and 
death.
9. Moral progress signifies a surrendering of brute force 
to persuasion, of narrow tribalism to the breadth of 
cosmopolitanism.
10. Exclusivism runs counter to the experiential basis of 
all religion, an experience that has its common foun­
dation in a sense of our common dependence on the 
saving grace of forces that far exceed our own.
Faith, Knowledge and Cosmopolitanism
THE familiar opposition between faith and knowledge is quite unsatisfactory when the terms are taken to represent mutually exclusive means of cognition. 
Knowledge involves faith and faith involves knowledge. A  
person cannot have faith in something of which he is not 
aware, and he would scarcely claim to identify a certain 
object unless he had faith in the reliability of his powers of 
apprehension. Some such truth would seem to apply to the 
systematic refinements of knowledge, as well as to rudimen­
tary forms of awareness, for both science and scholarship 
have their unproved presuppositions which constitute in­
dispensable conditions in any research enterprise. Recogni­
tion of this circumstance can serve to check the tendency 
to slip into excessive dogmatism and help to preserve mental 
flexibility. Cocksureness is usually born of narrowness — 
habitual concentration on our successes in the way of de­
monstration to the neglect of what we fail to demonstrate. 
We have been conditioned to prize tidiness in our thinking 
and perhaps find it disturbing to attend to the existentialist 
possibility that no set of generalisations can explain any 
individual entity in its concrete uniqueness. Our prompt 
reaction might well be to dismiss such a disquieting notion 
as expressive of mere romantic obscurantism. We might 
harden our minds in resistance, settling down more securely 
in an assurance of the sufficiency of our generalisations.
So it comes to pass that the systematic thinker, profes­
sionally preoccupied with so-called universal truths, can 
easily develop a blind spot for possible signs of the limita­
tions inherent in his approach and for chance indications of
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the schematic character of his general assertions. And it is 
here submitted that, besides being on his guard against 
temptations to indulge in academic pretentiousness, he 
should continually seek to preserve any native sensitivity 
to the possible presence of dangerous generalisations in his 
questionings — as, for instance, when it is asked whether 
the structure of language is revelatory of the structure of 
reality.1 Grammars vary considerably, and in putting such 
a question we may be myopically postulating that our own 
mother tongue is the type for all languages. And what could 
be more misleading? For example, no distinction of gender 
appears in the language of the Chocktaws, but it would 
hardly be sound anthropology to deduce therefrom that 
members of the tribe concerned do not react to perceptions 
of sexual difference, that for them humanity is unsexed!
The partial blindness to which we are referring can 
induce the sort of oversimplification that arises from equat­
ing our own particular point of view with that of a sup­
posedly absolute and eternal contemplator. Such confusion 
sometimes breeds the facile reductionism that would some­
how charm away all in human experience that cannot be 
directly translated into terms of physics and chemistry, re­
ducing man to the status of a monstrous mechanical con­
trivance. Reductionist philosophies are of various kinds, 
but they all argue on the same lines:2 thoughts are merely 
concomitants of bodily processes, physiology being a branch 
of chemistry; the world is merely a dark concourse of sense­
less particles in dancing motion; expressions of political 
opinion are merely the consequences of economic pressures; 
poetic inspiration is merely fantasy-fulfilment of a frustated 
sexual urge — and so on.
But curiously enough, an extreme reductionism really 
leaves no room for the investigator himself, an individual 
animated by purposes and concerned among other things
(1 ) Cf. Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, New York, 1962), pp. Iff.
(2 ) Cf. Aldous Huxley, Science, Liberty and Peace (London, 1946), pp. 35ff.
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about accuracy in his theoretical formulations. The fact is 
that serious research proceeds by way of abstraction; nature 
is far too rich in its intricacies to be explained all at once. 
Phenomena have to be studied piecemeal, and for the con­
trolled conditions of experiment in the natural sciences, 
artificially simplified situations are frequently created, situa­
tions divested as far as possible of factors irrelevant to the 
purpose in hand. Amid the welter of impinging complexities 
abstraction is needful, but error is likely to result when it is 
claimed that a theory appropriate to certain aspects of 
things is equally appropriate to all aspects or when qualita- 
tives are allowed to be swallowed up by quantitatives so 
that real differences in spatio-temporal modes of organisa­
tion are explained away.
Despite its abstractions and its piecemeal mode of pro­
cedure, scientific investigation nevertheless entails total 
assertions concerning the constitution of the world — as, 
for example, the faith that natural processes exemplify an 
intelligible orderliness. Such assertions are not demonstrated 
as particular hypotheses are demonstrated. They are pre­
supposed in the scientific activity, and it is in this connection 
that an analogy is discernible between the scientific and the 
religious attitude. For religious experience would seem to 
involve a certain identifiable kind of assumption concerning 
the nature of the world, a quasi-philosophical outlook 
apparently engendered by a deep feeling of fundamental 
harmony between the finite individual and objective reality. 
Just as the natural sciences include something more than 
empirical hypotheses, namely, faith in the world’s adapta­
tion to human intellection, so religion always seems to 
include something more than an ethic, namely, faith in the 
actual or potential favourableness of the world’s encom­
passing forces to human aspirations. Of course, the vague 
cosmological faith presupposed in the religious response to 
the surrounding universe is usually specified and elaborated 
in terms of current empirical knowledge, and this accounts 
for the fact that the famous conflicts between science and
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religion in recent centuries have in truth largely been con­
flicts between old and new doctrines about nature, its 
structures and ways of functioning. Nowadays it is widely 
held that a form of theism such as we find in Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam does not have to ally itself with a 
geocentric astronomy (the scope of God’s purpose is much 
wider than was suspected in ancient times) and does not 
have to set itself in opposition to evolutionary theory (God’s 
creation is a continuing process). Again, as is well known, 
biblical theism is associated with the notion of a three­
storied universe, but the repudiation of that view does not 
necessarily require the repudiation of theism as such; belief 
in a purposive Creator could be valid despite the outmoded­
ness of much biblical cosmology.
Furthermore, there apparently exists in man a deep- 
seated inclination to express cosmological beliefs in terms 
of purpose, and this seems to have been a contributory 
factor in the modern tension between science and religion. 
Unsophisticated people may still continue to think of causal 
relations generally as resembling their own personal trans­
actions with their environment. Thus if a phenomenon can­
not be explained by reference to the intervention of a human 
will, they tend to refer it to the intrusion of an invisible 
volitional agency, divine or Satanic. The physicist in modern 
times, however, has stressed so-called proximate causes and 
offered explanations in terms of impersonal forces.
This is sometimes put by saying that, whereas science 
answers questions of the how type, religion answers ques­
tions of the why type; and such a distinction has usefulness 
provided it is not construed as implying a sheer incompati­
bility. Thus an engineer could give a systematic account of 
the functional interrelations obtaining among the parts of 
a machine (answering how) and also explain the purpose 
of the designer in constructing the machine (answering 
why).  Again, as primary Buddhism, for instance, seems to 
show, the elaboration of a religiously grounded cosmology
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need not have its culminating point in the idea of a divine 
purpose that is being progressively realised in the historical 
course of events. And a theism derived from the biblical 
tradition need not subscribe to the naive teleology found in 
certain scriptural passages, namely, the view that infra­
human creatures were expressly created for the purpose of 
satisfying human needs. Sheep were not made for man, 
but man survives because he is able to live on sheep.3 This, 
so the modern theist might argue, is ultimately derived from 
the circumstance that creation is a prolonged and arduous 
business involving experimentation, a sort of cosmic applica­
tion of the method of trial and error.
As for the basic religious postulate that human aspira­
tions are rooted in the essential nature of things or that in 
his moral strivings after greater perfection man has reality 
somehow behind him, its validity is by no means self- 
evident, and it cannot be verified after the manner of an 
ordinary scientific hypothesis, such as Boyle’s Law, by the 
direct scrutiny of a few sample instances. It is of the same 
general character as faith in the intelligibility of reality, the 
total assertion implicated as a presupposition in scientific 
research. Nor is it safe to rely entirely upon the alleged 
disclosures of immediate intuitions, for the inner light of the 
religious consciousness could be an ignis fatuus. Thus the 
claims of religious sentiment need to be examined in relation 
to practice and to our general experience of life in the world. 
In this connection it could be pointed out that there are 
signs of the operation of an anti-degenerative tendency 
inherent in the universe, a constructive principle that has 
become self-conscious in humanity, so that in his creative 
moments man may be said to be participating in the work 
of a productive cosmic agency that makes for increased 
variety in the patterning of modes of organisation in the 
evolutionary process.4
(3) See Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London, 1934), vol. 2,
p. 344.
(4) Cf. Julian Huxley’s introduction to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s The
Phenomenon of Man (London, 1959), p. 27.
5
There could scarcely be an adaptation of organisms to 
their environment were there not an antecedent measure 
of adaptation on the part of the environment in its relation 
to organisms. Moreover, if the application of the principle 
of toleration allows of greater variety within the organised 
structure of any human society than does the forcible sup­
pression of all who deviate from the prevailing will of 
established authority, then moral progress may to some 
extent be assessed in terms of the degree to which the 
utilisation of brute force gives way to the principle of 
persuasion. Such development sociologically would be in 
line within the creative tendency abroad in the world and 
would mean that an ethic of charity, often characteristic of 
the prophetic teachings of the great world religions, is not 
so monstrously foolish as it might appear to be prima facie. 
Perhaps the cruelties attendant upon natural selection in the 
biological struggle for existence are part of the price that 
has to be paid in the progress towards a civilisation in which 
liberal education, charity and universalism come to pre­
dominate over brute force, exclusivism and tribalism.
When man is thus considered in relation to the world 
and when the mind is confronted with the larger issues of 
human existence, a sense of wonder may be evoked. In such 
philosophical contemplation thought is raised to a higher 
plane, beyond the littleness of our familiar day-to-day con­
cerns. Perception may pierce the hardening crust of habit 
and the mind become increasingly alive to what is trans­
cendent. The inward eye is opened to man’s finitude in face 
of the overwhelming vastness of the universe, and so second­
ary philosophical reflection and primary religious responses 
sometimes meet in the mingled fears and hopes of wonder 
before manifestations of the mysterium tremendum. Such 
openness engenders a healthy humility and needs to be 
matched on the moral plane by the openness of mind to 
mind in the mutual exchange of ideas. For it is through 
dialectical intercourse that the human individual grows in 
mental stature and that limited personal perspectives are
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broadened, merely subjective or private satisfactions giving 
way to the objective values of a public consensus. From this 
standpoint it seems clear that in our modern world the great 
religious traditions of East and West should make haste to 
outgrow persistent tendencies to that dogmatic exclusivism 
which is a vestigial survival of the xenophobia characteristic 
of tribal culture.
Apart from the fact that exclusivism belies much of the 
prophetic teaching which those religious traditions con­
serve, it runs counter to the experiential basis of all 
religion. For it would appear that religion has its common 
foundation in a disturbing feeling of the precariousness of 
human existence and its cherished values, of man’s ultimate 
dependence on the saving propitiousness of encompassing 
powers that far exceed his own.5 Thus, insofar as they are 
true to the spirit latent in their existential source, all religions 
have a common function to fulfil, namely, the promotion 
of the principle of fraternal cosmopolitanism. Otherwise 
put, the prophetic ethic of universal charity reaches back 
to a sensus numinis of the community of man in his finitude 
and commends the cultivation of a dynamic sympathy that 
cuts across all barriers of race and culture. It motivates 
efforts for the realisation of more comprehensive modes of 
human co-operation, for which the whole process of biologi­
cal evolution may be said to have prepared the way. This 
dynamic sympathy exemplifies a universalist character that 
is quite different from the tribalistic morality with which 
religion has for the most part been associated in the course 
of its prolonged history.6 Nevertheless, it does echo the 
pristine religious insight concerning the oneness of man in 
his extremity, an insight that coheres with the considered 
conviction that all men, having emerged on the same cosmic 
scene, are subject to the same imperious exigencies and have
(5) Cf. R. B. Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 463f.
161 Cf. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (London. 
1935), pp. Iff., et passim.
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to grapple with the same general problems in their en­
deavours to attain a richer and more stabilised common­
wealth of objective values.
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